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It is clear that  education  has an important effect on wages paid in the labour market  
However it not clear whether this is due to the role that education plays in raising the 
productivity of workers (the human capital explanation) or whether education simply reflects 
the ability of the worker (through a signalling role).  In this paper we describe and implement, 
using a variety of UK datasets, a number of tests from the existing literature for discriminating 
between the two explanations.  We find little support for signalling ideas in these tests. 
However, we have severe reservations about these results because our doubts about the 
power of these tests and the appropriateness of the data.  We  propose an alternative test, 
based on the response of some individuals to a change in education incentives offered to 
other individuals caused by the changes in the minimum school leaving age in the seventies.  
Using this idea we find that data in the UK appears to strongly support the human capital 
explanation. 
 
*   Chevalier, Harmon and Walker are Fellows of IZA in Bonn and are affiliated with the Institute for the Study of 
Social Change (ISSC) in Dublin  - this paper is issued  as part of  the ISSC  Policy Evaluation programme.  
Chevalier and Walker are affiliated with the Centre for the Economics of Education at the London School of 
Economics.  Harmon is affiliated with University College London through a Nuffield Foundation New Career 
Development Fellowship  in the Social Sciences.  The support of all of these bodies for facilitating this 
collaboration is acknowledged.  Thanks also to the UK Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the EU 
Commission for funding the Public Funding and Private Returns to Education (PuRE) network which supported 
earlier r esearch on which this paper builds.    David Thompson, in particular, of the DfES provided advice, 
encouragement and support in our earlier work. We are grateful to Richard Blundell and to conference and 
seminar  participants at the  LSE and the  Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam  for their comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies.       1 
1.  Introduction 
 
An important issue in the economics of education  is that individual education may have an 
effect on wages paid in the labour market - not because of any effect on productivity, but 
because education may simply act as a signal of productivity (or some characteristics that 
employers value because they contribute to productivity which they cannot easily observe). 
Employers, believing that education is correlated with productivity, will screen their 
employees and pay higher wages to more educated workers. The employers’ beliefs will be 
confirmed by their experience if it is the case that high productivity individuals signal this by 
choosing high levels of education. It will be optimal for individuals to behave in this way if 
the cost of acquiring education is less for high productivity individuals than it is for low 
productivity individuals. Thus, under reasonable conditions, the market will be characterised 
by a separating equilibrium where high productivity individuals choose high levels of 
education and earn high wages. The theory is largely due to Spence (1973, 1979) and the 
subsequent empirical literature has recently been reviewed by Groot and Oosterbeek (1994). 
In contrast, the earlier human capital explanation, due to Becker (1962) and Schultz 
(1962) suggests that the correlation between education and wages is due to the education 
enhancing productivity. A recent UK example is Blundell et al (2002) which uses detailed 
education and later earnings information on a cohort of individuals born in 1958 to show that 
the returns to a degree (typically of 3-year duration) relative to graduating from high school at 
18 (with 2 “A level” qualifications) is a 26% wage premium. 
  The fundamental difficulty in unravelling the extent to which education is a signal of 
existing productivity as opposed to enhancing productivity is that both human capital and 
signalling theories imply that there is a positive correlation between earnings and education. 
Indeed, Lazear (1977) in an early review stated that this “… makes it virtually impossible to 
come up with a valid test of the screening hypothesis …..” . Despite this pessimistic view, 
there have been many  attempts to distinguish between the theories. Almost all of these 
attempts have been based on the presumption that signalling/screening is more prevalent for 
some types of individuals (say, workers in sectors where productivity is hard to measure) than 
others.  
In this paper we implement several of the suggested methods for discriminating 
between the theories with UK data. We find the results of this unanimously in favour of the 
human capital explanation – but , in any event, we argue that these tests are weak since the   2 
differences that they rely on could also be rationalised by either signalling of human capital 
theories. However, there is one test, originally suggested and implemented on cross state US 
data by Lang and Kroop (1986), that exploits differences in changes in education levels in 
response to a change in the minimum level of education. Since the UK has had an increase in 
the minimum school leaving age we explore how this has impacted on the school leaving age 
distribution. We find no evidence of signalling from this exercise. Thus, we feel that the large 
estimated effects of education on wages are rates of return on human capital investment. 
 
2.  Evidence 
  The UK Dearing Report (1997) made much of the difference between the correlation 
between wages and education and the productivity effect of education on wages and termed 
the difference between the two a.  In the absence of information about the size of a the report 
included calculations for several values – with 20% and 40% being typically used.  
  In fact, there is very little evidence in the UK that pertains to a and here we provide 
some new evidence using methods that have typically been applied to discriminate between 
human capital and signalling models. We base our estimates on several datasets. We do not 
consider wider endogeneity issues that have been the concern of Blundell et al (2002) and 
Harmon and Walker (1995) for the UK, and of the review in Card (2000). Thus we do not 
control for any of the many selection effects that may be present in the data. So while each of 
our estimates are open to criticism we would argue that, since they all point in the same 
direction, they together provide useful evidence. 
We begin with conventional estimates for prime age (25-59) individuals in England 
and Wales using the large Labour Force Survey data pooled from 1993 to 2001
1. We compute 
an hourly wage rate from the ratio of usual earnings to usual hours (from the respondent’s 
main job).  Figure 1 shows the coefficient on years of education
2 in each year of the data, for 
men and women separately, controlling for a quadratic in age, region, year, decade of birth, 
having a work-limiting health problem, non-white, union and marital status. The samples are 
 
1   We exclude Scotland to reduce as far as possible the distortions caused by the difference in the education 
system in that region.  We also exclude those with zero or missing hours of work or earnings.  See Walker and 
Zhu (2002) for more details. 
2  Measured as year of continuous full-time education. We deal with “gap” years by including controls for 
whether the years of education “matched” the qualifications recorded in the data. Including gap year controls 
made little difference to any of the results.   3 
large (averaging more than 10,000 each year) and the estimates are very precise (t-values 
throughout exceed 40). The difference between men and women is highly significant and 
there are sizable year-to-year differences for both men and women but there is no significant 

























  The specification behind Figure 1 is extremely simple and assumes linearity in years 
of education.  One way of introducing greater flexibility is to control for qualifications rather 
than years of education.  Figures 2a and 2b shows the coefficients on selected qualification 
levels over time. There are no significant differences over time and no significant gender 
differences in the effects of O-Levels (5 GCSE grade A-C, CSE grade 1, and GCE grade 1-6) 
relative to no qualifications, or (first) degree relative to no qualifications.  The returns to 2+ 




3 The effect of 1 A-level, not reported here, is somewhat higher for women than men. Other qualifications not 
reported are Masters degrees, Doctorates and other higher educational qualifications which are largely post-
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  The participation rate in  higher education increased dramatically in the mid to late 
1960’s (due to the so-called “Robbins” expansion) and again in the 1990’s (when institutions 
were given strong financial incentives to admit more students). While there are no significant 
time trends in the effects of education years or qualifications on wages it may still be possible 
that more recent cohorts experience lower rates of return because of the rapid expansion of 
post-compulsory participation and participation in  higher  education
4  if  it is the case that 
young workers are not a good substitute for older ones.  
To explore this issue, that returns may have fallen across cohorts, we present estimates 
of  OLS and quantile regressions of the coefficient on years of education in Table 1  for a 
number of specific birth cohorts.  The idea behind looking at quantile regressions is that it 
gives us a feel for how returns vary across the ability distribution. On average, less able 
individuals will be concentrated in the bottom of the distribution and the more able towards 
the top. If it is the case that the expansion of education has been at the expense of a reduction 
in ability we might expect there to be a fall in returns at the bottom of the distribution as an 
increasing number of less-able individuals move into higher levels of education.  There does 
seem to have been a fall in the coefficient on years of education for the most recent cohort 
although the fall has not been disproportionately large for the bottom quantile.   
Table 2 presents OLS and quantile regression estimates of the coefficient on degree 
for those with at least two A-levels. The returns to a degree for women does seem to have 
fallen at the bottom quantile.  However, the returns to a degree for men, although lower, seem 
to have risen for the latest cohort across all quantiles.  There seems to be no support here for 
the idea that the latest cohort is not benefiting from a degree any less than earlier cohorts
5. 
These results also suggest little evidence for the idea that returns to children from lower social 
classes, who we might also expect to be more heavily represented at the bottom of the 
distribution, have higher returns (perhaps because of credit rationing). 
 
4  Card and Lemieux (2001) explore this issue using GHS data for the UK and comparable US and Canadian 
data.  
5  Appendix Table A1 presents estimates based on LFS data of the return to education for the birth cohorts in a 
specification that includes dummy variables for each schooling level.  This specification seems to support the 
finding of a reduction in the returns to leaving at 17 and 18 for men and women but the return to having a degree 
for recent cohorts has not changed.  The return to age gets very large but this could be because of the relative 
scarcity of well educated older individuals people in the most recent cohort. 
 
   6 
Table 1 
Return to Year of Education – Quantile Regressions (LFS Men & Women 1993-2001  by birth 
cohort) 
 








WOMEN:         
OLS  8.85  8.73  8.91  5.65 
  50.72  76.64  75.27  33.19 
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS         
25
th Percentile  8.59  8.32  8.46  5.63 
  47.42  64.89  66.42  32.23 
50
th Percentile  9.69  9.24  9.28  5.41 
  47.64  73.25  68.45  28.82 
75
th Percentile  9.82  9.70  9.36  5.80 
  40.28  52.73  57.39  24.73 
No. of Observations  16264  29808  31915  9690 
         
MEN:         
OLS  8.65  7.97  7.34  4.34 
  55.39  77.02  72.81  26.80 
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS         
25
th Percentile  8.10  7.73  6.95  3.90 
  39.62  60.44  54.48  19.49 
50
th Percentile  9.27  8.09  7.48  4.49 
  52.58  65.51  62.83  25.12 
75
th Percentile  9.79  8.43  7.81  4.72 
  48.60  58.35  58.14  22.64 
No. of Observations  16097  28288  33456  9938 
         
Notes: Figures are coefficients on years of education variable in samples of all workers. t values in italic. 
In addition to estimating the mean returns we can also investigate how this varies 
across individuals according to observable and unobservable characteristics. Table 3 reports 
estimates of a model that allows for the returns to education to differ across individuals both 
according to their observable characteristics (such as union status) and for unobservable 
reasons (see Harmon, Hogan and W alker (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the 
econometric model).  The results suggests some variance in the returns across individuals for 
unobservable reasons – but this variance, due perhaps to unobserved ability differences, does 
not appear to be any larger, and is arguably smaller, for more recent cohorts.   7 
 
Table 2   
OLS and Quantile Regressions: Return to Degree vs. 2+ A Levels (LFS Men & Women 1993-
2001  by birth cohort) 
 








WOMEN:           
OLS  21.51  22.38  22.98  18.95  23.77 
  21.97  7.00  12.66  12.82  10.09 
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS           
25
th Percentile  25.05  19.82  26.17  23.52  22.44 
  19.29  4.86  12.95  13.31  7.17 
50
th Percentile  22.41  27.26  27.27  19.76  22.90 
  20.82  9.07  16.66  13.41  8.53 
75
th Percentile  17.92  25.80  17.75  15.00  24.35 
  13.61  5.78  6.98  7.97  7.85 
No. of Observations  16454  1590  5011  6928  2925 
           
MEN:           
OLS  10.61  10.87  11.63  9.61  15.58 
  12.04  3.86  7.31  7.34  6.37 
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS           
25
th Percentile  14.07  14.95  17.60  13.46  16.47 
  3.64  3.97  9.09  9.33  5.45 
50
th Percentile  11.33  9.21  12.92  10.21  20.34 
  12.58  3.15  7.63  7.20  6.03 
75
th Percentile  7.23  4.50  4.89  7.23  17.92 
  6.28  1.39  2.32  4.48  5.30 
No. of Observations  21901  3020  7333  8621  2927 
           
Notes: Figures are coefficients on degree dummy variable in samples with 2+ A levels. t values in italic. 
One characteristic that we would like to allow for is the type of institution attended. 
Unfortunately the LFS does not report type of degree-granting institutions. However, recent 
research by  McKnight, Naylor and Smith (2000) uses the 6-month  follow up of the First 
Destination Surveys of the Higher Education Statistics Agency (for 52 “old” universities)  and 
finds some variance in returns, despite controlling in fine detail for subject studied, parental 
background, schooling experience, and exact A-level grades. However, this variance is not   8 
very large – 90% of institutions lie within 5% of the mean effect
6.  The issue of varying 
returns by institution type is the focus of Chevalier and Conlon (2002) using surveys of UK 
graduates from 1996 and 1998
7.  They estimate the returns to undergraduates for four types of 
higher education institution: so-called Russell Group (named after the organisational body 
representing the major research universities in the UK); ‘Old’ universities, which are the 
remaining universities established prior to 1991; polytechnics which, after 1991, were granted 
university status; and Other Institutions which include other degree awarding institutions in 
the higher education sector mostly representing teaching qualifications and colleges of art and 
music.   
Table 3 
Random Coefficient Estimates of Mean and Std Dev of Education Years Coefficient: Men and 
Women in LFS 1993-2001 
























































Notes: t values in parentheses. Models also contain union status, marital status, and health status and interactions 
of these with education years. A quadratic in age and year and region controls are also included. Source: Walker 
and Zhu (2002) 
Table 4 presents estimates taken from their study for the pooled sample from the 1985 
and 1990 graduate cohorts with earnings measured in 1996 (top panel) and the 1995 cohort 
with earnings measured in 1998 (bottom panel).  The two sets of estimates suggest substantial 
returns to graduates of the elite established universities over the  polytechnic graduates.  
However for the 1985-1990 cohorts the premium drops sharply when measures relating to 
degree class and subject, student ability (measured by A -level scores) and parental 
background are included.   Interestingly this does not occur for the 1996 cohort and there 
 
6  Moreover, in McKnight et al. (2000) earnings are not directly observed in the survey and are imputed from 
occupation averages taken from the New Earning Survey which will likely dampen the variance of earnings 
across individuals. 
7   The 1996 survey was conducted among graduates from the 1985 and 1990 cohort whilst the 1998 survey 
focused on the 1995 cohort. Both postal surveys are based on alumni data from a selected but representative 
group of UK tertiary institutions.   9 
seems to be a substantial premium to attending one of the established universities, from either 
the elite group or the remaining institutions, over the polytechnic sector which by this point 
would now be ‘new’ universities.   One possible explanation for this would be an increase in 
the variance of ability in entrants to these institutions since their change in status.  However 
an important caveat to note is that the wage measure is taken very shortly after graduation.  
This might point to an institution effect on starting wages or on the job quality as an 
alternative explanation for the difference between the two cohorts. 
 
Table 4 
Financial Returns to Undergraduates by Institution Type 
 
  1985-1990 (Cohorts pooled) 
Hourly wage in 1996 
























Prior A Level Score      ?  ? 
Class of Degree    ?  ?  ? 
Subject of Degree    ?  ?  ? 
Parental Occupation        ? 
School Attended        ? 
No. of Observations  5490  5490  5490  5490 
         
  1995 Cohorts 
Annual wage in 1998 
























Prior A Level Score      ?  ? 
Class of Degree    ?  ?  ? 
Subject of Degree    ?  ?  ? 
Parental Occupation        ? 
No. of Observations  5847  5847  5847  5847 
         
Note: robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the institution level. The hourly wage regression with 
controls for gender, cohort of graduation, observed labour market experience since graduation, employer’s size, 
permanent contract and region of residence. Omitted category -  Polytechnic institution (top panel) and New 
University or former Polytechnic institution (bottom panel). 
 
We can also see how the returns to a degree differs by subject studied since this is 
recorded in LFS data. Figures 4 shows the coefficients of degree subjects relative to 2 A -
levels, from related work by Walker and Zhu (2002),  for the subset of observations with at 
least 2 A -levels (higher degree coefficients are not reported) controlling for age, year and   10 
region. There are large differences in coefficients (the figures also show the 95% confidence 
interval) with Law, Health, Economics and Business, and Mathematics considerably higher 
than Arts, Education, and other Social Sciences.  Of course, these estimates fail to control for 
A-level score and this may explain some of the cross-subject differences  – although 
traditionally Arts courses have demanded quite high scores to gain admission while maths and 
science courses have required lower standards on average. Moreover, the estimates clearly 





















































Source: Walker and Zhu (2002) 
Figure 4  Returns to Degree by Degree Subject: LFS 1993-2001   11 
Of course, degree subject is itself the object of choices that students make. It has been 
suggested that children from poorer backgrounds choose subjects that have higher returns. On 
the other hand children from poorer backgrounds on average perform less well at school and 
this may affect their ability to pursue some subjects at University that demand high grades for 
admission.  Table 5 examines the subject choice of degree holders in the GHS data, and 
exploits information on family background and O-level performance, using multinomial logit 
estimation.  The omitted category is the choice of social science degree courses and the 
reference group for family background is having a father in a managerial position.    
Individuals with more O-levels are significantly more likely to choose a subject other than 
social science (the excluded group) or  engineering, while the familial background of 
individuals has limited effect once we control for number of O-levels..   
 
Table 5 
Determinant of subject choice for degree holder (GHS 82-92, odd years) 
 
  Arts  Engineering  Science  Other  Combined 
















































































Note: Model estimated by multinomial logit, robust standard errors are reported. The model includes dummies 
for survey year and a quadratic in age and a dummy variable for whether O-level information was missing. The 




  A related issue is overeducation, typically where a lower return is observed to years of 
education that are surplus to those needed for the job.  In order to analyse this issue total years 
of schooling for individuals must be split into required years and surplus years of education.  
There are a number of ways of measuring overeducation: subjective definitions based on self-  12 
reported responses to a direct question to workers on whether they are overeducated; or the 
difference between actual schooling of the worker and the schooling needed for their job as 
reported by the worker (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).  Alternatively a more objective measure 
can be derived from comparing years of education of the worker with the average for the 
occupation category as a whole or the job level requirement for the position held.  This is 
often criticized as the classification for the occupation may mix workers in jobs requiring 
different levels of education.  Moreover required levels of education are typically the 
minimum required and not necessarily indicative of the level of education of the successful 
candidate.  Chevalier (2003) deals directly with the definition of overeducation by noting that 
graduates with similar qualifications display variations in ability, which  may over-estimate 
the extent and effect of overeducation on earnings.  A sample of two cohorts of UK graduates 
is used collected by a postal survey organised by the University of Birmingham in 1996 
among graduates from 1985 and 1990 covering the range of UK institutions.  B ased on 
measures of job satisfaction this study is able to sub-divide those considered overeducated 
into ‘apparently’ and ‘genuinely’ overeducated.  The apparently over-qualified group is paid 
nearly 6% less than well-matched graduates but this pay penalty disappears when a measure 
of ability is introduced.  Genuinely over-qualified graduates have a reduced probability of 
getting training and suffer from a pay penalty reaching as high as 33%.   Thus genuine over-
education appears to be associated with a lack of skills that can explain 30% to 40% of the 
pay differential so that much of what is normally defined as over-education is more apparent 
than real. 
 
3.  Distinctions in the existing literature 
One approach to distinguishing between the two theories is to posit employer learning. 
Suppose employers do not observe productivity when workers are hired but workers will, 
with subsequent work experience, reveal their true productivity. Thus the correlation between 
wages and education should weaken with work experience. In jobs where screening is 
important we would expect to find that education explains much of the variation in wages 
early in working life. Riley (1979) divided his US Current Population Survey data into a 
group where screening is important (high education and low wage) and one where it is 
assumed not to be (low education and high wage).  He showed that the ratio of unexplained 
residuals in the screened group relative to that for the unscreened group tended to rise with 
work experience.     13 
Table 6 shows results for LFS data using tenure in the current job and looks for 
interactions between education and age, tenure or work experience on the grounds of 
employer learning.  There is a large tenure effect and a significant interaction  – but it is 
positive and not negative as signalling might lead up to expect. Similar results hold for age 
and accumulated work experience.  
Whether such a distinction is effective at discriminating between the two theories is, 
however, debatable. If education is effective as a signal then the better educated really are 
more productive and so will earn more even after the employer has learned. Altonji and 
Pierret (1996) explore this issue ingeniously by looking at how the correlation between wages 
and productivity-related variables that are not observed by the employer at the time of hiring 
(but are observed by the researcher) changes with work experience. They find that 
coefficients on these proxy variables rise quickly with work experience, suggesting rapid 
learning by employers. This suggests that the signalling value of education is small. 
Table 6 
Interactions between Education and Tenure - LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 
 
















N  104170  103325 
Note: t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age quadratic, year of survey and region of 
residence. 
A second approach uses direct information on ability from tests. This was followed 
first by Taubman and Wales (1973) and Pscharapolous and Layard (1974) and subsequently 
by Wolpin (1981). Wolpin, for example, divided his data into “dropouts” and non-dropouts 
and found that, controlling for ability and education, earnings differentials for those that 
completed a course were small relative to drop-outs. 
A variation on the theme of dividing the data into screening-prevalent and non-
prevalent groups divides the data according to competitive sector (the private sector or the 
self-employed) and the uncompetitive sector (the public sector or employees).   Brown and 
Sessions (1999), for example, exploit the self-employed distinction for Italy. They argue that 
individuals who plan to become self-employed do not have as large an incentive to invest in   14 
education. Thus the return to education for this group only reflects productivity while the 
returns for the employees reflects both human capital and a value as a signal. Psacharopolous 
(1979) exploits the distinction between private and public sectors where he argued that wages 
could depart from productivity in the public sector but not in the competitive private sector. 
Thus, returns should be higher in the public sector.  Such tests ignore the fact that the 
signalling model also suggests that productivity will increase with schooling levels which 
reflect ability. Moreover, this literature has failed to come to grips with the selection bias 
associated with being self-employed or being a public sector worker or that the underlying 
assumption is that individuals make the choice to be self-employed at the same time as their 
education decision
8.     
There are very few datasets that contain good income data for the self-employed to 
allow us to pursue the distinction between the returns to employees vs. the self-employed. 
However, the BHPS data in the UK does contain this information and we report estimates of 
the coefficient on education years in Table 7 where we find that the coefficients are not 
significantly different across the two groups, even when we control for selectivity.  Table 8 
shows a breakdown by public vs. private sector. There is a large effect of being a public 
sector worker and a significant interaction, but again it is in the wrong direction. 
Table 7 
Returns for Employed vs. Self-Employed – BHPS Waves 1-8 
  Employees  Self-employed   
  Return 
(s.e) 
N  Return 
(s.e) 
N  Signalling value 
 OLS           
Men  0.0641 
(0.002) 
10001  0.0514 (0.008)  1717  0.0131 (0.012) 
Women  0.1027 
(0.002) 
9550  0.0763 (0.015)  563  0.0264 (0.019) 
Selection           
Men  0.0691 
(0.003) 
10001  0.0552 (0.022)  1717  0.0139 (0.025) 
Women  0.1032 
(0.002) 
9550  0.0784 (0.066)  563  0.0248 (0.070) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The models include year dummies, marital status, and the number of 
children in three age ranges, region dummies, and regional unemployment rates. The Heckman selectivity estimates use 
father self-employed, mother self-employed, and housing equity as instruments. 
 
 
8  Both Brown and Sessions (1999), and Arabshebani and Rees (1998) attempt to do so but fail to use convincing 
identification restrictions.   15 
Table 8 
Returns for Public vs. Private Sector:  LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 
 














N  104002  103125 
Note: t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age quadratic, year of survey and region of 
residence. 
Layard and Psacharopolous (1974) suggested that, under signalling, individuals who 
complete qualifications slowly send a poor ability signal to employers and therefore face 
lower wages. Groot and Oosterbeek (1994), using  Dutch  longitudinal  data, propose that 
accelerated qualifications provide a signal of high ability and therefore ought to be associated 
with higher wages. Both of these papers find that they reject the signalling explanation. This 
idea is related to the so-called “sheepskin” effect whereby qualifications have a return that 
exceeds the return to the number of years spent acquiring them so that there are 
discontinuities in the returns to schooling at points associated with acquiring qualifications. 
Hungerford and Solon (1987) did, in fact, find significant evidence in US CPS data of large 
returns in certificated years of education.  However, subsequent work by Heywood (1994) 
suggested that these sheepskin effects were not, in fact, widespread but confined to certain 
sectors.  In Tables 9a and 9b we pursue the idea of sheepskin effects in two ways: allowing 
each year of education to have an independent coefficient and then testing for linearity; and 
controlling for education years but allowing each qualification to have an independent effect. 
In both cases we can reject the null of no sheepskin effects. 
Notwithstanding the empirical evidence, it is unclear why demand should be more 
concentrated in credential years in the signalling theory. Indeed, the costs of education will 
typically change in credential years - for example, in moving from (largely free) schooling to 
(relatively expensive) higher education. Moreover, knowledge may itself come in indivisible 
lumps and it makes sense for these lumps to be associated with credentials. Finally, the 
authors are not able to control for unobserved ability differences between those that complete 
a course and those that do not.   16 
 
Table 9a 
Sheepskin Effects:  LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 
 
  Women  Men 




























N  103344  104118 
Note: Default qualification is degree.  t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age 
quadratic, year of survey and region of residence. 
 
Table 9b 
Sheepskin Effects:  LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 
 
  Men  Women 






































N  103344  104118 
Note: Default qualification is left at 15. t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age 
quadratic, year of survey and region of residence. 
   17 
It has been suggested that under human capital theory the content of the curriculum 
matters to wages. That the curriculum makes a difference to wages is consistent with human 
capital theory and is not an implication of signalling theory. In particular, Miller and Volker 
(1984) suggest that graduates employed in jobs that are directly related to their earlier degree 
studies are exploiting their human capital while those that are employed is some different 
field are only exploiting the value that their degree has a signal. The difficulty with the 
approach is that neither occupation nor subject of study are exogenous and that the 
combination of the two is quite likely to be strongly associated with differences in motivation. 
The authors found some graduates did indeed earn more by working in their field of study, 
but many did not and it is this point that is regarded as evidence that signalling is important.   
This may suggest curriculum effects on wages that may point towards a human capital 
explanation rather than signalling.   
It is difficult to think of occupations that employ both graduates working with their 
degree discipline and graduates from a non-specialist background but law is an obvious 
candidate.  To investigate this idea further we separated out individuals who worked in the 
legal profession as solicitors, barristers and judges and estimated the impact of having studied 
law as an undergraduate on observed wages. The estimated effect, reported in Table 10 of 
having a law degree was close to 15% and statistically significant. This supports the idea that 
the curriculum matters and hence human capital theory.  However, again there is an important 
selection problem this is ignored here.   Moreover undertaking a law degree may be a signal 
of commitment that yields its own wage differential. 
 
Table 10  
Curriculum Effects - LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 working in Legal Profession 
 
  Men and Women 





N  427 
Note: t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age quadratic, year of survey, region and 
sex. 
 
A related but logically distinct approach, due to Kroch and Sjoblom (1994) argues that 
individual education relative to one’s cohort allows employers to infer ability (assuming that   18 
education capacity is fixed and that cohorts do not differ in terms of their ability). They find 
that relative education has only a weak effect on earnings while the absolute level of 
education had a large coefficient and conclude, therefore, that signalling is weak relative to 
human capital.  Table 11 investigates the effects of relative education. We define this as 
education minus mean education for the same birth year cohort.  Signalling suggests that 
relative education matters rather than education per se and, yet, here we find no significant 
effects.  However relative education may reflect cohort size if there is fixed capacity in 
education institutions. 
Table 11 
Relative Education Effects:    LFS Men and Women 1993-2001 
 











Note: t values in parentheses. Specifications also include controls for age quadratic, year of survey, region and 
union status. 
4.  School Leaving and the Minimum School Leaving Age 
In contrast to the tests above, which depend on differences in returns to education 
across different types of workers, the idea that able individuals attempt to signal their ability 
by acquiring more education than less able individuals lies behind the earlier work of Lang 
and Kropp (1984) and, more recently, by Bedard (2002).   
The property that Lang and Kropp (1986) exploit is that, under full information, a 
change in the minimum level of education possibly only affects the decision to exit for those 
individuals who wanted to leave at the previous minimum but does not affect those with 
education levels above the new minimum point. In contrast, under a signalling equilibrium a 
mandatory increase in the education level  of those at the minimum will also increase 
education levels for those with higher than the minimum level of education. The effect of the 
increase in the minimum affects the whole of the distribution of education, not just the bottom 
of the distribution.  The argument in Bedard (2002) is essentially symmetric: the relaxation of 
some constraint that previously prevented some individuals from achieving a high level of 
education allows those with lower levels of education to reduce their education levels. Thus, 
she looks for an effect of having  a local university on high school drop-out rates and finds the 
drop-out rate is higher when a college is present.   19 
In England and Wales there was an increase in the minimum school leaving age in 
1973
9 - this was referred to as RoSLA (Raising of the school leaving age). Prior to RoSLA 
close to 25% of each cohort left at the minimum of 15, while after the reform compliance was 
high and less than 5% were recorded as leaving at 15.   The institutional organisation of 
education in England and Wales at the time of the reform meant that children were divided at 
age 11 according to a test score.  Academic children then attended “Grammar” schools (or at 
private schools), took “O-level” qualifications at 16,  many would attain the required 5 O-
level passes and many of these would proceed and take “A-levels” at 18; around one-third of 
those with the minimum 2 A-level passes required to apply for university entrance would gain 
admission to university and the subsequent drop-out rate was  negligible. In contrast n on-
academic children attended “Secondary Modern” schools  from 11 and either  left at 15 
unqualified or took “CSE” qualifications at 16 and just a few of these would continue their 
schooling. From the late 1960’s  a programme of comprehensive schooling was introduced 
gradually across the country and this was (largely) completed by the late 1970’s.  
To illustrate the effect of the RoSLA, in Figure 5 we plot the residuals for secondary 
school outcomes for  individuals born 5 years before and after the reform, taken  from a 
regression of years of education against quarter of birth and LFS survey dummies for the 
entire LFS sample from the pooled 1993-2001 data.  We observe a significant movement in 
the residual for no qualifications below trend for the birth cohort first affected by RoSLA 
(1957Q3) and a somewhat smaller movement above trend for CSE and GCSE attainment 
from the same point.  A-level attainment on the other hand does not appear to differ across the 
time series.  To focus more closely on this issue Figure 6 plots the average attainment of 
secondary school outcomes by month of birth for the 1956-1958 birth cohort.   Individuals 
born in September 1957 are the first ones affected by the RoSLA reform and this is clearly 
illustrated in the plot, again in particular for outcomes where no qualification is received, 
which drops sharply
10.  We again also observe an marginal increase in numbers taking CSE 
and to a lesser extent GCSE but no obvious change in the numbers taking A-levels before and 
after the reform. 
 
9 Scotland changed two years later. But Scotland has quite a different education system and the typical school 
leaving age prior to the reform was 16 in any case. 
10  A simple Chow test on the ‘no qualification’ series suggest a significant structural break in the series for 
individuals born in the 4
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Figure 6  Highest Secondary School Outcome: Individuals born between January 1956 – 
December 1958 (LFS 1993-2001)   21 
 
 
  To focus on the effects of the RoSLA reform we select only the cohorts that were born 
between 1958 +/- 5 years from our datasets. Figures 7a and 7b shows the distribution of 
school leaving age for these cohorts broken down by pre and post reform. It is clear from 
these that almost all those that left at 15 prior to 1973 now left at 16 post 1973.  There would 
appear to be essentially no change in the post 16 distribution.  This can be examined using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution which is based on the maximum 
difference in the cumulative distribution between two populations (in our case the pre-and-
post RoSLA schooling distribution between 17 and 25 years).  Based on this test we can reject 
the null of equality of distribution for women only.  We cannot reject this null for the sample 
of males.   A simpler test based on a Duncan (Duncan and Duncan, 1955) displacement index, 
which can be interpreted as the proportion of one group that will have to change its education 
choice in order to make the distributions equal between the two groups, confirms this 
outcome.  For men only 2.83% of those in the 17-25 years portion of the post-RoSLA 
distribution would need to change education level in order to completely equalize the pre-and-













Figure 7a  Pre and Post RoSLA School Leaving Age Distribution – Men born 1953-1963 in  
LFS 1993-2001 












Figure 7b  Pre and Post RoSLA School Leaving Age Distribution – Women born 1953-1963 in  
LFS 1993-2001 
 
  Figures 8a and 8b show that there are marked differences in the school leaving age 
distribution – across the whole distribution. However RoSLA is still seen to have no effect on 
the distribution above 16 – it simply shifts people from 15 to 16. Breakdowns for parental 
social class and for parental self-employment also show no statistically significant effects 
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Figure 8a  Breakdown of Highest Qualification Pre and Post RoSLA - LFS 1993-2001 Men 
born 1953-1963 
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PreRoSLA PostRoSLA
 
Figure 8b  Breakdown of Highest Qualification Pre and Post RoSLA - LFS 1993-2001 Women 
born 1953-1963 
 
  It could be that the aggregate data is hiding important changes between types of 
people. For example, the policy might be expected to have a bigger effect on the post 16 
distribution for those who would otherwise be most likely to want to have higher education – 
but who were prevented from doing so pre-reform. Unfortunately the LFS data contains little 
background information that might be useful for looking in more depth. However, the General 
Household Surveys, which although smaller, are available back to the 1960’s and do contain 
two useful pieces of background information that may well be associated with education: 
parental social class and early smoking experience. Indeed, the latter variable has been used 
by Evans and Montgomery (1994) as an instrument for education.  Figure 8 shows the 
distribution (for men only).    Those that did not smoke early in life have, on average, 1.1 
additional years of schooling and even when one control for social background there is still a 
statistically significant effect that exceeds 0.7 for both men and women. We find that RoSLA 
has no effect above 16 for either early smokers or the non-smokers. 
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Figure 9  Pre and Post RoSLA School Leaving Age Distribution by smoking status at age 16- 
  MEN born 1953-63, GHS 82-92 (odd years) 
 
We also tested for the effects of RoSLA using simple models of the probability of 
attaining a particular qualification, conditional on having the preceeding qualification level.  
Table 12 reports the marginal effect from the RoSLA dummy in a number of specifications.  
For men the impact of RoSLA is solely focused on the movement from no qualifications to 
CSE (specification 1).   This finding is robust to the inclusion of paternal socioeconomic 
status (specification 2) and these controls are jointly significant.  It is also robust to the 
inclusion of paternal socioeconomic status interacted with the RoSLA dummy (specification 
3) although these additional interactions are not jointly significant in the regressions.    This 
finding is repeated for women for specifications 1 and 2.   Note also that, consistent with 
earlier findings, women also seem more likely to choose O-level over no qualification but that 
this is not robust to the inclusion of paternal socioeconomic background controls. 
Table 13 presents earnings regressions which exploit this experiment.  Individuals 
with no qualifications earn more in the post-RoSLA cohort, while there are no significant 
differences in the returns to other qualification. This premium for individuals with no 
qualification is consistent with the human capital model since individuals with no 
qualification but a school leaving age of 16 have an extra year of schooling compared to other 
individuals with no qualification.   
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Table 12 
Effect of Change in Minimum School Leaving Age on the Probability of Achieving 
Qualification Levels GHS 1982-92 (odd years) cohort born 1953-1963 
 
Men         






(1)  0.101  0.022  0.056  -0.098 
  (4.04)  (0.78)  (1.44)  (1.80) 
(2) = (1) + paternal SES  0.105  0.024  0.057  -0.097 
  (4.24)  (0.83)  (1.44)  (1.78) 
?
2 (6)  
A  356.5  530.4  93.5  30.5 
(3)= (2) + SES*SLA  0.070  -0.022  0.068  -0.115 
  (1.74)  (0.52)  (1.33)  (1.67) 
?
2 (6) 
A  233.1  275.2  25.1  20.1 
?
2 (6) 
B  4.8  3.5  7.9  6.8 
         
Observations  5166  5166  2650  1268 
Women         
(1)  0.075  0.078  0.018  -0.040 
  (2.59)  (2.10)  (0.38)  (0.54) 
(1) + paternal SES  0.070  -0.022  0.068  -0.115 
  (1.74)  (0.52)  (1.33)  (1.67) 
?
2 (6) 
A  181.0  330.4  93.5  30.5 
(3)= (2) + SES*SLA  0.034  -0.017  0.028  -0.020 
  (0.77)  (0.31)  (0.44)  (0.22) 
?
2 (6) 
A  106.7  154.1  25.1  20.10 
?
2 (6) 
B  3.5  7.03  7.9  6.8 
         
Observations  2812  2812  1836  768 
Note: (t-stat) adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Model (1) also includes dummies for birth year, parental origin, 
survey years and smoking behaviour at 16.  
A: F-test for joint significance of the paternal Socio Economic Status dummies 
B: F -test for joint significance of the interactions between paternal Socio Economic Status dummies and 
minimum school leaving age 
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Table 13 
Determinants of log wage, Individuals born between 1953-1963 (GHS 82-92 Odd years) 
 
  Men  Women 
A-levels  -0.180  -0.160 
  (4.64)  (3.74) 
O-levels  -0.203  -0.329 
  (7.03)  (8.79) 
CSE  -0.340  -0.457 
  (11.05)  (10.96) 
No qualification  -0.428  -0.698 
  (16.21)  (16.89) 
Rosla16  -0.039  -0.134 
  (1.11)  (2.93) 
A-levels * rosla16  0.027  0.040 
  (0.55)  (0.75) 
O-levels * rosla16  0.022  0.096 
  (0.58)  (2.02) 
CSE * rosla16  0.058  0.038 
  (1.49)  (0.72) 
No qualification * rosla16  0.086  0.181 
  (2.32)  (3.26) 
Observations  5166  2812 
R-squared  0.30  0.36 
Note OLS with robust standard errors (t-stat). The specification also includes a quadratic in age and dummies for 
survey years and region of residency. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Our review of the evidence on the effect of education on wages suggested that the 
effect, on average, was large – perhaps approaching 10% per additional year of education. 
However, we also have substantial evidence that the variance across individuals is large. 
Surprisingly, there is only limited support for variance associated with the type of higher 
education institution attended. This supports recent US research
11 that finds no role for 
attending an “elite” institution once controls for ability and background are included. 
However, we do find substantial cross subjective differences suggesting that curriculum 
matters.  
Our attempts to test whether the effects of education were due to enhanced 
productivity we found little, if any, evidence to support the alternative explanation  – that 
education differences simply reflect  pre-existing ability differences. However, we are 
 
11 See Dale and Krueger, 2002.   27 
doubtful of the value of these tests which attempt to discriminate between the theories by 
looking at how the correlation between education and wages differs across groups. Thus, we 
revisit an old idea suggested originally by Land and Kropp (1986) that under the signalling 
story any reform that affects the education decisions of a specific group with have a spillover 
effect on other groups not directly affected. In the UK the raising of the minimum school 
leaving age is one such reform. Our evidence on the schooling years distribution suggests 
that, contrary to Lang and Kropp (1986), there are no “ripples” from RoSLA – RoSLA just 
affected people at the minimum. We view this as support for the human capital interpretation 
of the correlation between education and wages.  
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Returns to years of education by cohort : Men (LFS 93-2001) 
  Cohort Born  
33-46 






         
age  0.041  0.057  0.095  0.162 
  (1.83)  (8.58)  (12.03)  (5.91) 
age2  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (2.43)  (7.27)  (9.80)  (4.31) 
tea==15  -0.468  -0.409  0.000  0.000 
  (26.66)  (31.02)  (.)  (.) 
tea==16  -0.246  -0.229  -0.245  -0.108 
  (14.53)  (15.16)  (22.71)  (6.24) 
tea==17  -0.131  -0.099  -0.112  -0.043 
  (4.73)  (8.50)  (12.44)  (2.10) 
tea==19  -0.001  0.005  -0.020  -0.021 
  (0.04)  (0.21)  (1.50)  (0.49) 
tea==20  0.010  0.083  0.054  0.081 
  (0.29)  (2.33)  (3.12)  (2.78) 
tea==21  0.126  0.203  0.234  0.187 
  (5.56)  (12.46)  (25.16)  (6.12) 
tea==22  0.162  0.168  0.220  0.205 
  (4.24)  (10.09)  (19.57)  (5.81) 
tea==23  0.131  0.146  0.177  0.134 
  (3.26)  (10.49)  (13.35)  (5.19) 
tea==24  0.190  0.235  0.135  0.086 
  (3.33)  (7.01)  (4.93)  (2.51) 
tea==25  0.223  0.187  0.151  0.082 
  (9.54)  (7.16)  (6.32)  (2.18) 
Observations  21910  32052  35682  10218 
R-squared  0.21  0.22  0.22  0.18 
Notes: Model includes dummies for year of survey and region of residence. Robust standard errors – t statistics 
in parentheses. 
 